First in Pakistan Army: Ex-army chief blames Pervez Musharraf, 3 others for Kargil War against India
Aziz said this was not right. "In his opinion, he should have been told about the proposed operation in advance so that he could have provided his analysis in advance," the report said.
A day after this conversation between Aziz and Butt, the latter called Aziz and told him that he had been invited to General Headquarters for a briefing on Kargil.
During the briefing, which was attended by all principal staff officers, Director General of Military Operations Lt Gen Tauqir Zia said units of the Northern Light Infantry and regular troops had captured areas in Drass-Kargil sector.
Aziz said he believed that though the briefing was conducted by Zia, it was clear he had not been aware of the operation from the beginning.
The day after Zia's briefing, reports about the Kargil operation appeared in the Pakistani media. The Indian media had carried reports a day earlier.
This shows, Aziz said, that Pakistan's military leadership was informed about such a "critical operation" only after it had begun and by that time, information was trickling down to the media.
At the briefing, Zia talked about airing pre-recorded Pashto messages that he hoped would be intercepted by Indian forces.
Zia's objective was that these intercepts would fool India into thinking that Afghan mujahideen had occupied areas in Kargil.
Aziz said he objected to the move as "these would get exposed very shortly".
This led to lengthy discussions and finally Zia conceded that the "truth could not be hidden for long".
During the briefing, Zia had also referred to the "objectives" of the operation, including cutting off India's supply lines to Siachen because of the closure of Zojila Pass on the Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.
This, Zia said, would block India from supplying its troops in Siachen and subsequently force it to vacate the glacier.